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1 Introduction
This paper studies mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity-sensitive
individuals. The central and novel aspect of our analysis is to consider ambiguous
mechanisms. That is, we give the designer the possibility to endogenously engineer
ambiguity in its mechanisms. After all, if individuals are ambiguity-sensitive, why should
we preclude the use of ambiguous mechanisms, if it helps the designer in achieving its
goals? As an example, consider a tax evasion problem. Tax authorities can be ambiguous
about the likelihood of auditing taxpayers. For instance, suppose that the tax authority
audits a taxpayer based on the draw of a ball from an urn containing a number of balls
of different colors with unknown proportions (an “Ellsberg” urn). Would this dose of
ambiguity help? As another example, consider the main refinancing operations of the
European Central Bank (henceforth, ECB). To provide short-term liquidities, the ECB
organizes weekly tender auctions, typically held every Tuesday. The ECB regulations
carefully and meticulously specify all aspects of the tender auctions, so that there is
little scope for ambiguity at this stage. However, prior to each weekly auction, the
ECB communicates with the eligible counterparts about their liquidity needs.1 And
the communication can be ambiguous. Again, would such ambiguity help the ECB in
steering the monetary policy? These questions echo the main theme of this paper: does
the introduction of ambiguity in mechanism design help the designer in achieving its
desired goals?
A natural starting point is to introduce ambiguity in the allocation rule. While
simple and indeed appealing, the introduction of ambiguity in the allocation rule does
not enlarge the set of (partially) implementable social choice functions, however.2 ,3 The
1See “The implementation of Monetary Policy In The Euro Area,” February 2011, European Central
Bank, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omo/html/index.en.html.
2In the sequel, we omit the qualifier “partial” and write “implementation” for “partial implementa-
tion.”
3See, however, the discussion towards the end of this section as to why the situation might be
different if the goal is to implement a social choice set.
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intuition is simple. While one can design an allocation rule that formally depends on
some extraneous random variable (e.g., the draw from an “Ellsberg” urn), the (equilib-
rium) outcome has to be invariant across the realized value of this random variable, if
the mechanism is to implement the given social choice function. Hence, a mechanism
with an ambiguous allocation rule cannot (in itself) implement a social choice function
that is not implementable by a classical (i.e., unambiguous) mechanism.
Nevertheless, we show that through the use of appropriately constructed ambiguous
mechanisms, it is possible to implement social choice functions that are not imple-
mentable by using a standard, unambiguous mechanism. The critical ingredient in such
construction is to add an ambiguous mediated communication stage prior to the un-
ambiguous allocation stage. Classical mediated communication is comprised of sets of
messages that agents can send to the designer, sets of messages that agents can receive
from the designer, and a (i.e., single) mapping from messages received by the designer to
probabilities over messages sent by the designer. Ambiguous mediated communication
differs by having instead a set of mappings from messages received by the designer to
probabilities over messages received. In essence, when an agent receives a message from
the designer, he is ambiguous about the exact communication device that has been used
by the designer. Our ambiguous mechanism is thus a mediated extension of a classical
mechanism; however unlike a classical mediated extension (Myerson, 1986; Forges, 1986,
1990), the extensions we consider are ambiguous.
An ambiguous mechanism, i.e., a classical mechanism extended by rounds of am-
biguous mediated communication, thus gives rise to a dynamic game with ambiguity-
sensitive players. Our first task is to define an appropriate notion of equilibrium - called
a “consistent planning equilibrium” - for such an environment. We next define the cor-
responding notion of incentive compatible social choice functions. The main theoretical
contribution of this paper is to provide a suitable revelation principle for this class of
mechanism design problems. An ambiguous “direct” mechanism is a direct revelation
mechanism for the allocation stage, extended by one round of mediated ambiguous com-
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munication. Our revelation principle (Theorem 1) states that a social choice function
is implementable by an ambiguous mechanism if and only if it is implementable by an
ambiguous “direct” mechanism.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on mechanism design with ambiguity-
sensitive individuals, e.g., Bodoh-Creed (2011), Bose et al. (2006), Bose and Daripa
(2009), Lopomo et al. (2010), Salo and Weber (1995), just to name a few. This liter-
ature differs from our analysis in one fundamental aspect, however. While we give the
designer the possibility to endogenously engineer ambiguity, this literature constrains
the designer to offer classical unambiguous mechanisms (often static, moreover). In par-
ticular, if there is no exogenous ambiguity, a social choice function is implementable
by an unambiguous mechanism if and only if it is (classically) incentive compatible
(Myerson, 1979). With no exogenous ambiguity and unambiguous mechanisms, it is as
if individuals are ambiguity-insensitive. In contrast, even when there is no exogenous
ambiguity, Proposition 1 demonstrates that the set of implementable social choice func-
tions enlarges dramatically when ambiguous mechanisms are allowed. For instance, we
revisit the classical monopolistic screening problem and show that ex-post full surplus
extraction is possible, even when there is no ex-ante uncertainty.
After having completed this work, we became aware of a work in progress by Di
Tillio, Kos and Messmer. These authors also explore the effects of introducing ambigu-
ity in mechanisms in environments with ambiguity-sensitive preferences (more precisely,
multiple-prior preferences). While the two works are closely related and indeed com-
plement each others, there is a number of important differences. To start with, they
focus on the revenue maximization problem in a single seller-buyer setup, whereas our
objective is to characterize the entire set of social choice functions implementable by
ambiguous mechanisms. Secondly, and more importantly, they introduce ambiguity in
the allocation rule, so that the buyer is uncertain about the alternative to be imple-
mented, even conditional on messages sent. As mentioned earlier, while we also consider
the possibility of introducing ambiguity in the allocation rule, we show that it has no
4
effect for the implementation of social choice functions (see Section 6.2); this explains
our focus on the introduction of ambiguity at the pre-allocation stage. Nonetheless, as
their work suggests, introducing ambiguity in the allocation rule can expand the set
of social choice sets that are implementable. Indeed, the revenue maximization prob-
lem of a seller, selling to a buyer privately informed about the valuation of the object,
corresponds to the implementation of a set of social choice functions (and not to the
implementation of a single social choice function). For instance, if the buyer has a con-
tinuum of possible valuations, any pair of social choice functions that differ in a set of
measure zero are equivalent. Di Tillio et al. show that the introduction of ambiguity
in the allocation rule makes it possible for the seller to extract more surplus from the
trade, and when the buyer has a continuum of possible valuations, the seller can even
extract the entire surplus (under the assumption that the distribution of valuations is
atomless). Another important difference with our work is their focus on pure strategies.
In contrast, we explicitly consider mixed strategies, which we think is an essential and
fundamental component of any model with ambiguity averse agents.
We now present a simple example that illustrates the main arguments and intuitions
of our analysis.
2 An Introductory Example
This section illustrates our main results with the help of a simple example. There are
two players, labeled 1 and 2, two (payoff-relevant) types θ and θ′ for each player, and
four alternatives x, y, z and w. Types are private information. Throughout, we write
“i” for “i ∈ {1, 2}” and omit the qualifier “j 6= i,” whenever no confusion arises.
We assume that players have multiple-prior preferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler,
1989) and prior-by-prior updating (full Bayesian updating); see Pires (2002) for an
axiomatization. Denote Pi(θ) (resp., Pi(θ
′)) the set of priors of player i of type θ (resp.,
θ′) and ui his utility function. An element of Pi(θ) (resp., Pi(θ
′)) represents a prior belief
of player i of type θ (resp., θ′) about the likelihood of player j’s type to be θ. Utilities
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are given in the table below. For instance, at state (θ, θ′), the utility of z to player 1
(resp., player 2) is 3 (resp., 0).
(u1, u2) (θ, θ) (θ, θ
′) (θ′, θ) (θ′, θ′)
x (2, 2) (2, 0) (0, 2) (0, 0)
y (1, 3) (1, 2) (0, 3) (0, 2)
z (3, 1) (3, 0) (2, 1) (2, 0)
w (0, 0) (0, 2) (2, 0) (2, 2)
The designer aims at (partially) implementing the ex-post efficient social choice func-
tion f defined by: f(θ, θ) = x, f(θ, θ′) = y, f(θ′, θ) = z and f(θ′, θ′) = w.4
Assume that priors are independent of types, so that Pi(θ) = Pi(θ
′) := Pi. To crisply
illustrate the role of ambiguity in mechanism design, we consider the starkest possible
case, whereby there is no ex-ante ambiguity, i.e., Pi is the singleton {pi} for each player
i. For concreteness, assume that {pi} = {2/3}.
Clearly, no classical mechanism implements the social choice function f , since it
fails to be incentive compatible. Yet, we argue that introducing some ambiguity in an
otherwise classical mechanism makes it possible to implement f .
The central idea of this paper is to add a communication stage prior to the allocation
stage and to introduce ambiguity at the communication stage.5 More specifically, sup-
pose that prior to the allocation stage, the players can communicate with the designer,
i.e., they can send messages to and receive messages from the designer. A communi-
cation device specifies the messages players can send, the messages players can receive,
and a probability system specifying the probabilities with which messages are sent to
the players conditional on messages received from the players. A communication device
is ambiguous if it specifies a (non-singleton) set of probability systems.
4Note that if we change the payoff of 3 to a payoff of 3− ε with ε > 0 small enough, all our results
go through and f is the unique ex-post efficient social choice function.
5As Section 6 demonstrates, ambiguity at the allocation stage does not help in implementing f .
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To see how the ambiguous communication stage makes it possible to implement f ,
consider first the hypothetical situation where player i has ambiguous beliefs about the
type of player j. Suppose that f is incentive compatible with respect to the set of beliefs
Π∗i , i.e.,
min
pii∈Π∗i
ui(f(θ, θ), θ)pii + ui(f(θ, θ
′), θ)(1− pii) ≥
min
pii∈Π∗i
[σi(ui(f(θ, θ), θ)pii + ui(f(θ, θ
′), θ)(1− pii))+
(1− σi)(ui(f(θ
′, θ), θ)pii + ui(f(θ
′, θ′), θ)(1− pii))],
for all σi ∈ [0, 1].
6 In words, truth-telling is optimal for player i of type θ whenever
player i expects player j to truthfully report his type and has the set of priors Π∗i about
the type of player j. For instance, f is incentive compatible with respect to {0, 1} or
[0, 1].7 The crucial insight of this paper is that it is possible to construct an ambiguous
communication device such that, conditional on every message player i can receive from
the communication device, his posterior beliefs are precisely Π∗i .
To illustrate further, we now construct an ambiguous communication device that
generates the set of beliefs Π∗i := {0, 1} for each player i. To this end, assume that each
player can send θ or θ′ to the designer, can receive ω or ω′ from the designer and that
there are two possible probability systems λ and λ′. Denote λi(ωi|θj) the probability that
player i receives the message ωi ∈ {ω, ω
′} conditional on player j’s message θj ∈ {θ, θ
′}
and let λ((ω1, ω2)|(θ1, θ2)) = λ1(ω1|θ2)λ2(ω2|θ1) for each possible (ω1, ω2) and (θ1, θ2).
Assuming λi(ω|θ) = 1 and λi(ω
′|θ′) = 1 thus fully defines the first probability system
λ. Similarly, the second probability system λ′ is fully specified by λ′i(ω|θ
′) = 1 and
λ′i(ω
′|θ) = 1.8 Clearly, if the probability system is λ, player i’s posterior belief is 1 if
he receives the message ω and 0, otherwise. Alternatively, if the probability system is
6Since it is strictly dominant for player i of type θ′ to truthfully report his type, we focus on player
i of type θ.
7More generally, it is incentive compatible for all [pii, pii] with pii ≤ 1/2.
8Note that each probability system is a cyclic permutation of the other. This will play an important
role in the general construction later.
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λ′, player i’s posterior belief is 0 if he receives the message ω and 1, otherwise. Thus,
regardless of the message received, player i’ set of posteriors is Π∗i = {0, 1}.
It thus remains to argue that a stage of mediated and ambiguous communication prior
to the allocation stage indeed implements f . Concretely, the implementing ambiguous
mechanism is as follows. In the first stage, players communicate with the designer
through the ambiguous communication device constructed above. In the second stage,
players announce their types to the designer, who then implements an alternative accord-
ing to f . It is important to note that the allocation depends only on the second-stage
reports. The implementing mechanism is thus the classical direct mechanism extended
by a phase of mediated communication.
So, assume that player j truthfully reports his type to the communication device
at the first stage and truthfully reports his type at the second stage, regardless of the
messages he has sent and received in the first stage. It follows from the construction
of the communication device that player i’s beliefs at the second stage are given by Π∗i ,
regardless of the messages he has sent and received in the first stage. Thus, player i
has an incentive to truthfully reveal his type at the second stage. Lastly, since player
i expects player j and himself to truthfully reveal their types at the allocation stage,
regardless of the messages sent and received, he has no incentive to lie at the first stage.
The social choice function f is thus implementable by an ambiguous mechanism.
While this construction might puzzle the reader, we now provide a decision-theoretic
interpretation of our construction that shed light on important conceptual issues.
A decision theoretic interpretation. Consider an urn containing 90 balls. Each
ball is marked with either (θ, ω), (θ, ω′), (θ′, ω) or (θ′, ω′). There are 60 balls marked
with θ and 30 balls marked with θ′. Moreover, the composition of the urn is one of only
two possible compositions. With the first composition, all balls marked with θ (resp.,
θ′) are also marked with ω (resp., ω′). With the second composition, all balls marked
with θ (resp., θ′) are also marked with ω′ (resp., ω).
A ball is drawn from the urn at random. The decision maker is offered two bets, A
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and B. The bet A gives x if the ball is marked with θ and y if the ball is marked with
θ′, while the bet B gives z if the ball is marked with θ and w if the ball is marked with
θ′. Prior to choosing a bet, the decision maker can observe whether the ball is marked
with ω or ω′. The decision problem is represented in Figure 1; the first (resp., second)
line corresponds to prizes in state θ (resp., θ′).
The decision maker is player 1 of type θ in our mechanism design problem. The state
space represents the possible types of player 2 and messages player 1 can receive from
the communication device constructed above. Moreover, the possible composition of the
urn respects the prior belief of player 1 as well as the ambiguity in the communication
device. Finally, conditional on player 1 of type θ expecting player 2 to tell the truth, the
bet A corresponds to player 1 telling the truth, while the bet B corresponds to lying.
Formally, the state space is {θ, θ′} × {ω, ω′} and the set of priors beliefs of the decision
maker is {(2/3, 0, 0, 1/3), (0, 2/3, 1/3, 0)}. We maintain the assumption of multiple prior
preferences and assume prior-by-prior updating (full Bayesian updating).
ω′ω
B
z
w
A
x
y
B
z
w
A
x
y
Figure 1: The decision problem
Clearly, upon learning whether the ball is marked with ω or ω′, the decision maker
strictly prefers A over B and, more generally, over any randomization between A and
B.
Consider now the ex-ante plans AA, AB, BA and BB, where the first (resp., second)
letter corresponds to the choice of bet conditional on ω (resp., ω′). For instance, the
plan AB prescribes the choice of A if ω is revealed and the choice of B if ω′ is revealed.
Assume that the decision maker evaluates the plan AB by “reducing” it to the bet giving
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x if the ball is (θ, ω), y if the ball is (θ′, ω), z if the ball is (θ, ω′), and w if the ball is
(θ′, ω′). Similarly, for the other plans.
We have that the decision maker strictly prefers the plan BB to the plan AA, the
plan AA to the plans AB and BA, and is indifferent between the plans AB and BA.9
To sum up, we have that conditional on either ω or ω′, the decision maker strictly
prefers A to B, but ex-ante, he strictly prefers the plan BB to AA. The decision maker’s
preferences are dynamically inconsistent and our construction precisely exploits this fact.
We briefly comment on this fundamental aspect of our analysis and refer the reader
to the special issue of Economics and Philosophy (2009) for an in-depth discussion and
further references. Dynamic consistency and Bayesian updating are intimately related
to Savage’s sure-thing principle, and ambiguity-sensitive preferences generally entail a
violation of the sure-thing principle. Consequently, if one wants to analyze ambiguity-
sensitive preferences, then either dynamic consistency or full Bayesian updating must
be relaxed, at least to some extent. The approach we follow in this paper is to relax
the assumption of dynamic consistency. To analyze dynamic games with dynamically
inconsistent preferences, we assume that players are consistent planners, i.e., at every
information set a player is active, he choses the best strategy given the strategies he will
actually follow and the opponents’ strategies (see Siniscalchi, 2010).
An alternative approach would be to maintain a form of dynamic consistency and to
relax the assumption of full Bayesian updating. Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) provide
such an alternative for the multiple-prior preferences. Without entering into details,
their approach would require to update the prior (2/3, 0, 0, 1/3) upon observing ω and
the prior (0, 2/3, 1/3, 0) upon observing ω′, so that the plan BB remains conditionally
optimal.10 Thus, according to their updating rule, the set of priors to be updated depend
on the conditioning events (and, more generally, on the set of feasible plans and the
unconditionally optimal plan considered). Whether one likes this feature or not, this is
a logical implication of relaxing consequentialism so as to maintain dynamic consistency.
9More generally, the plan BB is preferred to any mixture over the plans AA, AB, BA and BB.
10We assume that the feasible set of plans is AA, AB, BA and BB.
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We refer the reader to Siniscalchi (2009, 2010) and Al Najjar and Weinstein (2009)
for more on this issue. Furthermore, we hasten to stress that a violation of dynamic
consistency as defined in Hanany and Klibanoff (2007, axiom DC, p. 268) is not a
necessary condition for our results to hold. To see this, let us modify the example so
that u1(w, θ) = 1 = u2(w, θ). With this modification, the decision maker strictly prefers
BB to AA and, conditional on either ω or ω′, is indifferent between A and B. This does
not violate axiom DC of Hanany and Klibanoff and yet f remains implementable by
the ambiguous mechanism constructed above.
Yet, another alternative approach is to maintain consequentialism and (a form of)
dynamic consistency, but to limit the possible attitude towards ambiguity. For instance,
Epstein and Schneider (2001) provide a condition on the set of priors, called rectangular-
ity, that guarantees the absence of preference reversals. In our example, their approach
would require the set of priors to be
{(2/3, 0, 0, 1/3), (0, 2/3, 1/3, 0), (1/3, 0, 0, 2/3), (0, 1/3, 2/3, 0)}.11
Importantly to us, regardless of the strengths and weaknesses of those approaches,
ambiguous mechanisms can implement social choice functions that are not ex-ante in-
centive compatible only if (a form of) dynamic inconsistency is assumed.
To conclude, we preview some secondary aspects of our analysis. Firstly, it is not
difficult to see that our construction continues to apply when there is ex-ante ambiguity.
For instance, suppose that player i set of priors is [p
i
, pi]. If pi > 1/2, the ambiguous
communication device constructed above generates the required posteriors for the social
choice function f to be incentive compatible (with respect to that set of posteriors).
Alternatively, if p
i
≤ 1/2, the social choice function f is ex-ante incentive compatible
and, thus, there is no need for ambiguous communication.
11With this set of priors, the social choice function f is implementable by a classical (unambiguous)
direct mechanism. Alternatively, this follows from Epstein and Schneider’s definition of dynamic con-
sistency, which says that if A is conditionally preferred to B, conditional on both events ω and ω′, then
AA is unconditionally preferred to BB.
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Secondly, we have implicitly assumed that the decision maker considers only two
possibilities: either the urn has the first composition or has the second composition.
Alternatively, we might assume that the decision maker entertains all possibilities, so
that his set of priors is the convex hull of (2/3, 0, 0, 1/3) and (0, 2/3, 1/3, 0). This would
not change our arguments: conditional on ω or ω′, the set of updated beliefs would
include the posteriors (1, 0, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0, 0), and that is all we need for f to be
implementable.
Lastly, our results extend naturally to a larger class of preferences. Section 6.1
elaborates on this issue.
3 Preliminaries
Notations. For any collection of n sets, Y1, . . . , Yn, we let Y := ×j∈{1,...,n}Yj and Y−i :=
×j∈{1,...,n}\{i}Yj, with generic element y and y−i, respectively. For any measurable space
(Y,BY ), we denote ∆(Y ) the set of probability measures over Y . Let µ : Y → ∆(Y
∗)
be a measurable function between (Y,BY ) and (∆(Y
∗),B∆(Y ∗)). For any event E ∈ BY ∗ ,
we write µ(y)[E] for the probability of the event E according to µ(y). In the sequel,
we assume that most sets (types, alternatives, messages, etc) are finite, so as to avoid
unnecessary technicalities (e.g., measurability of strategies, conditioning on events with
measure zero, etc). As section 6.4 demonstrates, our analysis extends to more general
sets with appropriate measurability conditions.
Environments. An environment is a tuple 〈N,X, (Θi)i∈N〉 where N := {1, . . . , n}
is a finite set of n players, X a finite set of alternatives, and for each player i ∈ N , Θi is
a finite set of payoff-relevant types. Types are privately known. A social choice function
f : Θ→ X assigns an alternative to each profile of types.
Preferences and updating. Let Hi := {hi : Θ−i → X} be the set of player
i’s acts. Player i of type θi has type-dependent preferences over ∆(Hi), the set of
mixtures over acts; preferences are ambiguity-sensitive. Throughout most of the paper,
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we assume that preferences have the maxmin expected utility representation (Gilboa
and Schmeidler, 1989). More precisely, there exist a payoff function ui : X × Θ → R
and a non-empty, convex and closed valued correspondence Pi : Θi → ∆(Θ−i) such that
player i of type θi evaluates the act hi as
min
pi∈Pi(θi)
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(hi(θ−i), θi, θ−i)pi(θ−i).
For simplicity, we assume full support, i.e., Pi(θi) is in the interior of ∆(Θ−i) for any θi.
Beliefs are type-independent if for each player i ∈ N , there exists Pi ∈ ∆(Θ−i) such that
Pi(θi) = Pi for all θi ∈ Θi. Type independence is weaker than stochastic independence.
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We assume prior-by-prior updating (full Bayesian updating). Before going further, it is
important to stress that our results do not crucially hinge on this particular represen-
tation of ambiguity-sensitive preferences. A number of other representations, such as
α-maxmin, minimax regret, variational preferences, deliver the same results. Section 6.1
critically discusses these assumptions and offers some generalizations.
Ambiguous mechanisms. Ambiguous mechanisms have two essential compo-
nents: allocation mechanisms and ambiguous communication devices. An allocation
mechanism is a pair 〈(Mi)i∈N , g〉 where for each player i, Mi is a finite set of messages
and g : ×i∈NMi → X is an allocation rule. An allocation mechanism is thus a classical
static mechanism.
A communication device is a tuple 〈(Ω∗i ,Ωi)i∈N , λ〉, where Ω
∗
i is a (finite) set of
messages that player i can send to the communication device, Ωi a (finite) set of messages
that player i can receive from the communication device and λ : ×i∈NΩ
∗
i → ∆(×i∈NΩi)
a system of probability distributions: λ(ω∗)[ω] is the probability that the profile of
messages ω is sent to the players by the communication device, conditional on the profile
of messages received ω∗. An ambiguous communication device (for short, ambiguity
device) is a tuple 〈(Ω∗i ,Ωi)i∈N ,Λ〉, where Λ is a finite set of probability systems.
Given an allocation mechanism 〈M, g〉, we define the mediated extension of 〈M, g〉
12Beliefs are stochastically independent if Pi = ×j 6=iP
j
i with P
j
i ∈ ∆(Θj).
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as a mechanism in which T < ∞ stages of mediated communication are allowed before
〈M, g〉 is played. More precisely, there are T + 1 stages. At stage t ∈ {1, . . . , T},
players communicate through the ambiguity device 〈(Ω∗i,t,Ωi,t)i∈N ,Λt〉, i.e., each player
i communicates a message ω∗i,t ∈ Ω
∗
i,t to the ambiguity device and receive a message
ωi,t ∈ Ωi,t. Communication is private and simultaneous. At stage T + 1, players choose
a message mi ∈ Mi and the designer implements an alternative according to g. In
words, prior to the allocation stage, players have the opportunity to communicate with
each others through mediated communication devices. Communication is ambiguous
and, moreover, does not directly influence the alternative implemented (cheap talk); the
alternative implemented at the allocation stage T + 1 depends only on the messages
reported at stage T + 1. We call such a mechanism an ambiguous mechanism.
Fix an ambiguous mechanism 〈〈(Ω∗i,t,Ωi,t)i∈N ,Λt〉t=1,...,T , 〈(Mi)i∈N , g〉〉. DenoteH
1
i :=
{∅} the initial history and for T+1 ≥ t > 1, H ti := ×
t−1
τ=1(Ω
∗
i,τ×Ωi,τ ) the set of all possible
histories of messages sent and received up to stage t by player i. The set of terminal
histories is ×i∈N (H
T+1
i ×Mi). Note that for any two terminal histories (h
T+1, m) and
(h˜T+1, m˜) such thatm = m˜, the alternative implemented is the same. However, expected
payoffs might differ because of difference in beliefs.
Behavioral strategies. A behavioral strategy si for player i is a mapping si :
(∪t≤T+1H
t
i ) × Θi → (∪t≤T∆(Ω
∗
i,t)) ∪ ∆(Mi) with si(h
t
i, θi) ∈ ∆(Ω
∗
i,t) for t ≤ T and
si(h
T+1
i , θi) ∈ ∆(Mi).
Assessments. For each player i, for each stage t, for each history hti and for each
type θi, we denote Π
H,Θ
i (h
t
i, θi) ⊆ ∆(H
t
−i × Θ−i) the set of beliefs of player i of type
θi, conditional on the history h
t
i, about the types θ−i of his opponents and their private
histories ht−i. The belief correspondence Π
H,Θ
i : (∪t≤T+1H
t
i )×Θi → ∪t≤T+1∆(H
t
−i×Θ−i)
with ΠH,Θi (h
t
i, θi) ⊆ ∆(H
t
−i ×Θ−i) for each (h
t
i, θi) is called an assessment.
We impose the following two conditions on assessments. Firstly, assessments are
consistent with initial priors, i.e., ΠH,Θi ({∅}, θi) = Pi(θi) × 1{∅} for each θi ∈ Θi, for
each player i ∈ N . Secondly, assessments are consistent with “prior-by-prior” Bayesian
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updating, whenever possible. More precisely, fix a profile of behavioral strategies (si)i,
a history hti and a type θi for player i. If (ω
∗
i,t, ωi,t) has positive probability, i.e., there
exist pii(h
t
i, θi) ∈ Π
H,Θ
i (h
t
i, θi) and λt ∈ Λt such that
∑
ht
−i,θ−i,ω
∗
−i,t,ω−i,t
pii(h
t
i, θi)[(h
t
−i, θ−i)]s−i(h
t
−i, θ−i)[ω
∗
−i,t]λt((ω
∗
i,t, ω
∗
−i,t))[(ωi,t, ω−i,t)] > 0,
we update pii(h
t
i, θi) to pii((h
t
i, (ω
∗
i,t, ωi,t)), θi), with
pii((h
t
i, (ω
∗
i,t, ωi,t)), θi)[(h
t
−i, (ω
∗
−i,t, ω−i,t)), θ−i)] =
pii(h
t
i, θi)[(h
t
−i, θ−i)]s−i(h
t
−i, θ−i)[ω
∗
−i,t]λt((ω
∗
i,t, ω
∗
−i,t))[(ωi,t, ω−i,t)]∑
ht
−i,θ−i,ω
∗
−i,t,ω−i,t
pii(h
t
i, θi)[(h
t
−i, θ−i)]s−i(h
t
−i, θ−i)[ω
∗
−i,t]λt((ω
∗
i,t, ω
∗
−i,t))[(ωi,t, ω−i,t)]
.
Thus, whenever (ω∗i,t, ωi,t) has positive probability, Π
H,Θ
i ((h
t
i, (ω
∗
i,t, ωi,t)), θi) is obtained
from ΠH,Θi (h
t
i, θi) by taking the union over all pii(h
t
i, θi) ∈ Π
H,Θ
i (h
t
i, θi) and λt ∈ Λt
such that the above is well-defined. Alternatively, if (ω∗i,t, ωi,t) has zero probability,
ΠH,Θi ((h
t
i, (ω
∗
i,t, ωi,t)), θi) is unconstrained.
Consistent planning equilibrium. A consistent planning equilibrium (for short,
equilibrium) is defined inductively by “backward induction.” It captures the idea that at
stage t, a player chooses a plan of actions among the plan of actions that he will actually
follow at later stages. Formally, a profile of strategies and assessments (s∗,ΠH,Θ) is an
equilibrium if for each player i ∈ N , for each type θi ∈ Θi of player i, for all histories
hT+1i , s
∗
i (h
T+1
i , θi) satisfies the following:
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min
pii(h
T+1
i ,θi)∈Π
H,Θ
i (h
T+1
i ,θi)

 ∑
(θ−i,h
T+1
−i )
pii(h
T+1
i , θi)[θ−i, h
T+1
−i ]
(
∑
(mi,m−i)
ui(g(mi, m−i), θi, θ−i)s
∗
i (θi, h
T+1
i )[mi]s
∗
−i(θ−i, h
T+1
−i )[m−i])

 ≥
min
pii(h
T+1
i ,θi)∈Π
H,Θ
i (h
T+1
i ,θi)

 ∑
(θ−i,h
T+1
−i )
pii(h
T+1
i , θi)[θ−i, h
T+1
−i ]
(
∑
(mi,m−i)
ui(g(mi, m−i), θi, θ−i)s
T+1
i [mi]s
∗
−i(θ−i, h
T+1
−i )[m−i])

 ,
for all sT+1i ∈ ∆(Mi). In words, the strategy prescribes the choice of a best response at
each possible history hT+1i .
Denote Ui(s
∗
i (θi, h
T+1
i ), s
∗
−i(θ−i, h
T+1
−i ), θi, θ−i) player i’s expected payoff under s
∗ when
the history at stage T + 1 is (hT+1i , h
T+1
−i ) and the type profile is (θi, θ−i), i.e.,
∑
(mi,m−i)
ui(g(mi, m−i), θi, θ−i)s
∗
i (θi, h
T+1
i )[mi]s
∗
−i(θ−i, h
T+1
−i )[m−i].
We now move to stage T . Fix an history (hTi , h
T
−i) and a probability system λT ∈ ΛT .
Conditional on the type profile (θi, θ−i), the subsequent history (h
T+1
i , h
T+1
−i ) is
((hTi , (ω
∗
i,T , ωi,T )), (h
T
−i, (ω
∗
−i,T , ω−i,T ))
with probability
s∗i (h
T
i , θi)[ω
∗
i,T ]s
∗
−i(h
T
−i, θ−i)[ω
∗
−i,T ]λT ((ω
∗
i,T , ω
∗
−i,T ))[(ωi,T , ω−i,T )],
in which case the expected payoff is Ui(s
∗
i (θi, h
T+1
i ), s
∗
−i(θ−i, h
T+1
−i ), θi, θ−i). Thus, con-
ditional on any history hTi , player i’s continuation payoff is well-defined and we can
proceed with the definition of an equilibrium. At an equilibrium (s∗,ΠH,Θ), for each
player i ∈ N , for each type θi ∈ Θi of player i, for all histories h
T
i , s
∗
i (h
T
i , θi) must satisfy
the following:
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min
(λT ,pii(h
T
i ,θi))∈ΛT×Π
H,Θ
i (h
T
i ,θi)
∑
(θ−i,hT−i)
pii(h
T
i , θi)[(θ−i, h
T
−i))]

 ∑
Ω∗
T
×ΩT
(
Ui(s
∗
i (θi, (h
T
i , (ω
∗
i,T , ωi,T ))), s
∗
−i(θ−i, (h
T
−i, (ω
∗
−i,T , ω−i,T )), θi, θ−i)
s∗i (h
T
i , θi)[ω
∗
i,T ]s
∗
−i(h
T
−i, θ−i)[ω
∗
−i,T ]λT ((ω
∗
i,T , ω
∗
−i,T ))[(ωi,T , ω−i,T )]
))
≥
min
(λT ,pii(h
T
i ,θi))∈ΛT×Π
H,Θ
i (h
T
i ,θi)
∑
(θ−i,hT−i)
pii(h
T
i , θi)[(θ−i, h
T
−i))]

 ∑
Ω∗
T
×ΩT
(
Ui(s
∗
i (θi, (h
T
i , (ω
∗
i,T , ωi,T ))), s
∗
−i(θ−i, (h
T
−i, (ω
∗
−i,T , ω−i,T )), θi, θ−i)
sTi [ω
∗
i,T ]s
∗
−i(h
T
−i, θ−i)[ω
∗
−i,T ]λT ((ω
∗
i,T , ω
∗
−i,T ))[(ωi,T , ω−i,T )]
))
,
for all sTi ∈ ∆(Ω
∗
i,T ). For each player i ∈ N , for each type θi ∈ Θi, for each history h
T+1
i ∈
HT+1i and h
T
i ∈ H
T
i , having defined s
∗
i (h
T+1
i , θi) ∈ ∆(Mi) and s
∗
i (h
T
i , θi) ∈ ∆(Ωi,T ), we
then proceed by “backward” induction to define the optimal strategy at each stage.
In a nutshell, a consistent planning equilibrium is similar to a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium of a game between multiple selves of the same player with max-min expected
utility. Notice that our specification of consistent planning differs slightly from the fully
behavioral approach of Siniscalchi (2010). His specification incorporates a specific tie-
breaking rule, stipulating that when a player has two or more optimal strategies at a
given stage, ties are broken at earlier stages. Assuming such a tie-breaking rule would
not substantially affect our results; only a minor modification to the concept of incentive
compatibility (to be defined shortly) is needed.
A history hT+1i has positive probability under the profile of strategies s
∗ if there exist
a sequence (λ1, . . . , λT ) ∈ Λ1 × · · · × ΛT and a type θi ∈ Θi such that h
T+1
i has strictly
positive probability when evaluated according to (λ1, . . . , λT ) and (si(θi, ·), s−i). With
these preliminaries done, we can now define the notion of implementation by ambiguous
mechanisms.
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Definition 1 The ambiguous mechanism 〈〈(Ω∗i,t,Ωi,t)i∈N ,Λt〉t=1,...,T , 〈(Mi)i∈N , g〉〉 (par-
tially) implements the social choice function f if there exists a consistent planning equi-
librium (s∗,ΠH,Θ) such that
g(mi, m−i) = f(θi, θ−i),
for all (mi, m−i) with ×i∈Ns
∗
i (θi, h
T+1
i )[mi] > 0, for all (h
T+1
i , h
T+1
−i ) having positive
probability under s∗.
According to Definition 1, for a social choice function to be implementable, there
must exist an ambiguous mechanism and an equilibrium such that for all histories of
messages sent to and received from the communication devices, for all messages sent
at the allocation stage following these histories, the designer implements the correct
outcome. The aim of this paper is to characterize the set of social choice functions that
are implementable by ambiguous mechanisms.
4 Revelation Principle
This section presents our main results. We first define incentive compatibility.
4.1 Incentive Compatibility
A social choice function is incentive compatible if players have an incentive not only to
truthfully reveal their types at the allocation stage when they expect others to do so,
but also to generate the information (and, thus, beliefs) designed for their types at the
communication stage.
Definition 2 A social choice function f is incentive compatible for player i ∈ N if
there exists a non-empty valued correspondence Πi : Θi × Θi → ∆(Θ−i) such that for
each θi ∈ Θi,
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min
pii∈Πi(θ
′′
i ,θi)
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i) ≥
min
pii∈Πi(θ
′′
i ,θi)
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
∑
θ′i∈Θi
σi(θi)[θ
′
i]ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i),
(IC)
for all σi(θi) ∈ ∆(Θi), for all θ
′′
i ∈ Θi. The social choice function f is Πi-incentive com-
patible if it is incentive compatible for player i with respect to the belief correspondence
Πi. The social choice function f is incentive compatible if it is incentive compatible for
each player i ∈ N .
Intuitively, Πi(θ
′′
i , θi) is the set of beliefs player i of type θi has at the allocation stage
when he communicates as type θ
′′
i at the communication stage. Incentive compatibility
thus requires truth-telling to be a “max-min” equilibrium of the direct allocation mech-
anism, even when players are untruthful at the communication stage. Consequently,
players have an incentive to be truthful at the communication stage. Two additional re-
marks are worth making. Firstly, Definition 2 explicitly considers mixed strategies. This
is crucial as ambiguity-sensitive preferences frequently display ambiguity aversion, for
which hedging is essential. Secondly, with a slight abuse of notation, let Pi(·, θi) ≡ Pi(θi)
for all θi. Clearly, if the social choice function f is Pi-incentive compatible for each player
i, then it is implementable by an ambiguous mechanism. Yet, as the example in section
2 shows, incentive compatibility with respect to the prior beliefs is not necessary for the
implementation of social choice functions by finite mechanisms. The rest of this section
is devoted to the full characterization of implementable social choice functions by finite
ambiguous mechanisms.
4.2 The Main Theorem
For any ambiguity device 〈(Θi,Ωi)i∈N ,Λ〉, define the belief function ζθi : Θi × Pi(θi) ×
Ωi × Λ→ ∆(Θ−i) as
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ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi, ωi, λ)[θ−i] =
∑
ω−i
λ((θ′i, θ−i))[(ωi, ω−i)]pθi(θ−i)∑
ω−i
∑
θ−i
λ((θ′i, θ−i))[(ωi, ω−i)]pθi(θ−i)
.
So, ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi, ωi, λ) ∈ ∆(Θ−i) is the posterior belief of player i of type θi when he
sends the message θ′i to and receives the message ωi from the communication device
〈(Θi,Ωi)i∈N , λ〉, and has prior beliefs pθi (conditional on player i’s opponents telling the
truth). Similarly, for any λi : Θi × Θ−i → ∆(Ωi), we denote ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi, ωi, λi) ∈ ∆(Θ−i)
the posterior belief of player i of type θi when he sends the message θ
′
i to and receives
the message ωi from the communication device 〈Θi,Ωi, λi〉, and has prior beliefs pθi .
Theorem 1 The following statements are equivalent:
1. The social choice function f is implementable by a finite ambiguous mechanism.
2. For each player i ∈ N , there exists a finite family of non-empty valued correspon-
dences (Πki : Θi ×Θi → ∆(Θ−i))k∈Ki such that:
(IC) For each k ∈ Ki, the social choice function f is Π
k
i -incentive compatible.
(B) There exist Ωi := ∪k∈KiΩ
k
i and λi : Θi ×Θ−i → ∆(Ωi) such that
∪pθi∈P (θi) ∪ωi∈Ωki {ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi, ωi, λi)} = Π
k
i (θ
′
i, θi), (B)
for all θ′i ∈ Θi, for all θi ∈ Θi, for all k ∈ Ki.
Before presenting the formal proof, let us comment on Theorem 1. Theorem 1 is
a revelation principle; it states necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice
function to be implementable by a finite ambiguous mechanism. More specifically, if a
social choice function is implementable, then it is incentive compatible with respect to
some sets of beliefs (condition (IC)). Moreover, those sets of beliefs must result from
the mediated communication and, thus, must satisfy a martingale property (condition
(B)). An important element of (the necessity part of) the proof is the observation that
if a social choice function f is implementable with T stages of mediated communication,
then it is implementable with a single stage of mediated communication. While intuitive
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and indeed well-known in the literature on mediated communication, this observation is
not as trivial as it may appear in a world with dynamically inconsistent preferences. To
get some intuitions, consider the following decision problem. There is a single player, two
payoff-relevant types θ and θ′, two messages ω and ω′, and two acts f1 and f2 (acts map
Θ−i to X), with f1 ≻
θ
{ω} f2, f1 ≻
θ
{ω′} f2 at state θ, and f2 ≻
θ′
{ω} f1, f2 ≻
θ′
{ω′} f1 at state θ
′
(<θh (resp., ≻
θ
h) denotes the (resp., strict) preference relation at state θ conditional on
history h). We want to “implement” f1 at state θ and f2 at state θ
′. See the left panel
of Figure 2 for the decision problem.
ω′ω
ω′
f2
ω
f1
ω′
f2
ω
f1
(ω′, ω′)
f2
(ω, ω)
f1
Two stages One stage
Figure 2: The decision problem
Clearly, it is a consistent planning equilibrium for the decision maker of type θ (resp.,
θ′) to announce ω (resp., ω′) at all histories, thus implementing f1 at state θ and f2 at
state θ′. Alternatively, consider the one-period decision problem on the right panel of
Figure 2. With dynamically consistent preferences, we have f1 <
θ
{∅} f2 and f2 <
θ′
{∅} f1,
so that it is an equilibrium for the decision maker of type θ (resp., θ′) to announce
(ω, ω) (resp., (ω′, ω′)), thus also implementing f1 at state θ and f2 at state θ
′. However,
if preferences are dynamically inconsistent, we might have f2 ≻
θ
{∅} f1 or f1 ≻
θ′
{∅} f2,
so that the one-period decision problem is not “equivalent” to the two-period decision
problem. This issue, however, does not create difficulties in our framework. Recall that
our definition of implementation requires the correct outcomes to be implemented at all
histories of messages with positive probabilities. As applied to this decision problem, our
definition thus requires the correct outcome to be implemented at (ω, ω) and (ω′, ω′),
which essentially requires f1 to be equal to f2 .
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Conversely, to implement a social choice function that satisfies conditions (IC) and
(B), we construct a simple two-stage mechanism that consists of an allocation stage and a
stage of mediated communication prior to the allocation stage. The communication stage
generates the appropriate posterior beliefs at the allocation stage, so as to guarantee
truth-telling. To be more precise, suppose that the social choice function f is incentive
compatible with respect to Πi, with Πi satisfying condition (B). Thus, there exists a
communication device 〈Θi,Ωi, λ
∗
i 〉 such that the set of all posteriors of player i of type θi
is Πi(θ
′
i, θi) whenever he sends θ
′
i to the device and others truthfully report their types.
Yet, this does not imply that the set of posteriors is Πi(θ
′
i, θi) conditional on any ωi
and, consequently, this does not guarantee truth-telling at the allocation stage which is
guaranteed only if the set of posteriors conditional on any ωi is Πi(θ
′
i, θi). Consider a
permutation ρ : Ωi → Ωi and define λ
ρ
i by λ
ρ
i (θi, θ−i)[ωi] = λ
∗
i (θi, θ−i)[ρ(ωi)]. We have
that ∪pθi∈P (θi){ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi, ωi, λ
ρ
i )} = ∪pθi∈P (θi){ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi, ρ(ωi), λ
∗
i )}. The idea is then to
consider the set of communication devices Λi as the union over all cyclic permutations
of {λρi }; this guarantees that the set of posteriors conditional on any ωi is Πi(θ
′
i, θi), as
required.
The classical revelation principle may be viewed as a corollary of Theorem 1. To see
this, note that if we restrict the beliefs’ correspondences to be single-valued, the model is
indistinguishable from subjective expected utility. So, let us assume that Pi(θi) = {pθi}
for all players i ∈ N , for all types θi ∈ Θi, and suppose that the second statement in
Theorem 1 is true with each Πki being single-valued. The Π
k
i -incentive compatibility of
f implies that for all θi ∈ Θi, for all θ
′
i ∈ Θi, for all θ
′′
i ∈ Θi,
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pi
k
θ′′i ,θi
[θ−i] ≥
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pi
k
θ′′i ,θi
[θ−i],
with {pik
θ′′i ,θi
} := Πki (θ
′′
i , θi). The classical incentive compatibility of f then follows from
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condition (B), i.e., for all i ∈ N , for all θi ∈ Θi, for all θ
′
i ∈ Θi,
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pθi[θ−i] ≥
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pθi [θ−i].
13
Conversely, if the social choice function f is classically incentive compatible, then the
second statement of Theorem 1 trivially holds with Πi(·, θi) ≡ {pθi} for each θi.
Proof (2)⇒ (1). The proof is constructive. Suppose that for each player i ∈ N , there
exists a unique non-empty valued correspondence Πi : Θi × Θi → ∆(Θ−i) such that
conditions (IC) and (B) hold. (We treat the general case of a family of correspondences
in Appendix.)
We consider a two-stage ambiguous mechanism, where players announce a type to the
communication device in the first stage, receive messages in the first stage conditional
on their announcements, and again report a type in the second stage. Formally, we con-
sider the ambiguity device 〈×i∈NΘi,×i∈NΩi,Λ〉 and the (direct) allocation mechanism
〈×i∈NΘi, f〉. The first step in the proof consists in constructing Λ.
Step 1: Construction of Λ. Since condition (B) holds, for each player i ∈ N , there
exist Ωi and λ
∗
i : Θi ×Θ−i → ∆(Ωi) such that
∪ωi∈Ωi ∪pθi∈P (θi) {ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi, ωi, λ
∗
i )} = Πi(θ
′
i, θi),
for all θ′i ∈ Θi, for all θi ∈ Θi. Consider a permutation ρ : Ωi → Ωi and define
λρi : Θi × Θ−i → ∆(Ωi) with λ
ρ
i ((θi, θ−i))[ωi] = λ
∗
i ((θi, θ−i))[ρ(ωi)] for all ωi, for all θ−i.
Let Λi be the collection of all λ
ρ
i such that ρ is a cyclic permutation (the cardinality of
Λi is thus the cardinality of Ωi). It follows that
∪λi∈Λi ∪pθi∈P (θi) {ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi, ωi, λ
ρ
i )} = ∪ωi∈Ωi ∪pθi∈P (θi) {ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi, ωi, λ
∗
i )} = Πi(θ
′
i, θi),
13More precisely, for each θi ∈ Θi, for each θ′′i ∈ Θi, we have
∑
k∈Ki
(
∑
ωi∈Ω
k
i
∑
ω−i∈Ω−i
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
λi(θ
′′
i , θ−i)[(ωi, ω−i)]pθi [θ−i]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
λk
θ′′
i
,θi
)pikθ′′
i
,θi
= pθi ,
with
∑
k∈Ki
λkθ′′
i
,θi
= 1 and λkθ′′
i
,θi
≥ 0 for each k ∈ Ki.
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for all ωi ∈ Ωi, for all θ
′
i ∈ Θi, for all θi ∈ Θi. Lastly, for each i ∈ N , choose λi ∈ Λi and
define λ : ×i∈NΘi → ∆(×i∈NΩi) with λ((θi)i∈N )[(ωi)i∈N ] = ×i∈Nλi((θi, θ−i))[ωi]. The
set Λ is the collection of all such λ.
Step 2: Construction of the equilibrium. Consider the following profile of strate-
gies. At the initial history, players truthfully report their types to the ambiguity device,
i.e., s∗i ({∅}, θi) = θi for all θi ∈ Θi, and for any history (θ
′
i, ωi) of messages sent and re-
ceived at the communication stage, player i of type θi truthfully reports his type at the
allocation stage, i.e., s∗i ((θ
′
i, ωi), θi) = θi for all histories (θ
′
i, ωi) ∈ Θi×Ωi of messages sent
and received and type θi ∈ Θi. Assessments are consistent with Bayes rule, whenever
possible. More precisely, suppose that the history (θ′i, ωi) has positive probability, i.e.,
there exist λi and θ−i such that λi(θ
′
i, θ−i)[ωi] > 0. Define the posterior pi
H,Θ
i ((θ
′
i, ωi), θi)
conditional on the history (ωi, θ
′
i) and type θi by
piH,Θi ((θ
′
i, ωi), θi)[(ω−i, θ−i)] =
λi(θ
′
i, θ−i)[ωi]λ−i(θ
′
i, θ−i)[ω−i]pθi [θ−i]∑
θ−i,ω−i
λi(θ′i, θ−i)[ωi]λ−i(θ
′
i, θ−i)[ω−i]pθi[θ−i]
,
and let ΠH,Θi ((θ
′
i, ωi), θi) be the union over all λi ∈ Λi for which there exists θ−i such that
λi(θ
′
i, θ−i)[ωi] > 0. If the history (θ
′
i, ωi) has zero probability, simply let Π
H,Θ
i ((θ
′
i, ωi), θi)
to be equal to ΠH,Θi ((θ
′
i, ω
∗
i ), θi) for some (θ
′
i, ω
∗
i ) with positive probability (at least one
exists).
Step 3: No profitable deviation. By construction of the ambiguity device, we
have that the beliefs of player i of type θi about the types θ−i of his opponents are
Πi(θ
′
i, θi) at history (θ
′
i, ωi), regardless of ωi. Since the social choice function is Πi-
incentive compatible for each player i ∈ N , it follows that no player has a profitable
deviation from truth-telling at any history (θ′i, ωi) ∈ Θi × Ωi. Finally, no player has
a profitable deviation at the first stage, since they expect f to be implemented in the
second stage, regardless of their first stage announcement. This completes this part of
the proof.
(1) ⇒ (2). Suppose that the social choice function f is implementable by the am-
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biguous mechanism
〈〈(Ωˆ∗i,t, Ωˆi,t)i∈N , Λˆt〉t=1,...,T , 〈(Mi)i∈N , g〉〉.
From Lemma 1 in Appendix, f is implementable by a two-stage mechanism, in which
players directly and truthfully report their types to the communication device at the
communication stage. Denote the two-stage mechanism by
〈〈(Θi,Ωi)i∈N ,Λ〉, 〈(Mi)i∈N , g〉〉.
Thus, there exists a consistent planning equilibrium (s∗,ΠH,Θ) such that g(mi, m−i) =
f(θi, θ−i) for all (mi, m−i) with s
∗
i (hi, θi)[mi]s
∗
−i(h−i, θ−i)[m−i] > 0, for all (hi, h−i) hav-
ing positive probability under s∗, and s∗i ({∅}, θi)[θi] = 1 for all θi. Observe that a
non-terminal history hi 6= {∅} for player i is a message sent and received, i.e., (θ
′
i, ω
′
i).
Moreover, the history (θ′i, ω
′
i) has positive probability if there exist λ ∈ Λ and θ
′
−i ∈ Θ−i
such that
∑
ω−i
λ(θ′i, θ
′
−i)[(ω
′
i, ω−i)] > 0.
14
Consider player i of type θi and any history hi = (θi, ωi) having positive probability.
By definition of a consistent planning equilibrium, we have that
min
pii(hi,θi)∈Π
H,Θ
i (hi,θi)

 ∑
(θ−i,h−i)
pii(hi, θi)[θ−i, h−i]
(
∑
(mi,m−i)
ui(g(mi, m−i), θi, θ−i)s
∗
i (hi, θi)[mi]s
∗
−i(h−i, θ−i)[m−i])

 ≥
min
pii(hi,θi)∈Π
H,Θ
i (hi,θi)

 ∑
(θ−i,h−i)
pii(hi, θi)[θ−i, h−i]
(
∑
(mi,m−i)
ui(g(mi, m−i), θi, θ−i)si[mi]s
∗
−i(h−i, θ−i)[m−i])

 ,
for all si ∈ ∆(Mi). In particular, this is true for any deviation si such that si(θi, hi) =∑
θ′i
σi(θi)[θ
′
i]s
∗
i (θ
′
i, hi) with σi(θi) ∈ ∆(Θi) and si coincides with s
∗
i , otherwise. Thus, we
14Because of the assumption of full support, this is equivalent to: there exist λ ∈ Λ and pθi ∈ Pi(θi)
such that
∑
θ−i
∑
ω−i
λ(θ′i, θ
′
−i)[(ω
′
i, ω−i)]s
∗
−i(θ−i)[θ
′
−i]pθi(θ−i) > 0.
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have
min
pii(hi,θi)∈Π
H,Θ
i (hi,θi)
∑
(θ−i,h−i)
pii(hi, θi)[θ−i, h−i]ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i) ≥
min
pii(hi,θi)∈Π
H,Θ
i (hi,θi)
∑
(θ−i,h−i)
pii(hi, θi)[θ−i, h−i]

∑
θ′i
σi(θi)[θ
′
i]ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi, θ−i)

 ,
for all σi(θi) ∈ ∆(Θi). It follows that there exists a set Π
k
i (θi, θi) ⊆ ∆(Θ−i) of beliefs of
player i of type θi such that
min
pii∈Πki (θi,θi)
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i) ≥
min
pii∈Πki (θi,θi)
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
∑
θ′i∈Θi
σi(θi)[θ
′
i]ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i),
for all σi(θi) ∈ ∆(Θi). More precisely, for any history hi and type θi, denote Π
Θ
i (hi, θi) :=
∪
pii(hi,θi)∈Π
H,Θ
i (hi,θi)
{
∑
h−i
pii(hi, θi)[(h−i, θ−i)]} and let Π
k
i (θi, θi) = Π
Θ
i ((θi, ωi), θi). With
any other history (θi, ω
′
i) such that Π
Θ
i ((θi, ω
′
i), θi) = Π
Θ
i ((θi, ωi), θi), we thus associate
the same set of beliefs Πki (θi, θi). Note that Π
Θ
i (hi, θi) = ∪λ∈Λ∪pθi∈Pi(θi){ζθi(θi, pθi, ωi, λ)},
when hi = (θi, ωi).
Similarly, consider any history hi = (θ
′
i, ωi) having positive probability. As above,
there exists a set of beliefs of player i of type θi, Π
k
i (θ
′
i, θi), such that
min
pii∈Πki (θ
′
i,θi)
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i) ≥
min
pii∈Πki (θ
′
i,θi)
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
∑
θ′i∈Θi
σi(θi)[θ
′
i]ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i),
for all σi(θi) ∈ ∆(Θi). Replicating the arguments for each type of player i and each
history thus implies the existence of a finite family of non-empty valued correspondences
(Πki : Θi × Θi → ∆(Θ−i))k∈Ki such that the social choice function f is Π
k
i -incentive
compatible, for each k ∈ Ki.
To complete the proof, for each λ ∈ Λ, define λi : Θi × Θ−i → ∆(Ωi) with for all
(θi, θ−i),
λi(θi, θ−i)[ωi] :=
∑
ω−i∈Ω−i
λ(θi, θ−i)[(ωi, ω−i)],
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and let Λi be the set of all such λi. Let Ω
∗
i := Ωi×Λi and define λ
∗
i : Θi×Θ−i → ∆(Ω
∗
i )
as follows:
λ∗i (θi, θ−i)[(ωi, λi)] :=
1
|Λi|
λi(θi, θ−i)[ωi],
for all (θi, θ−i). Lastly, for each k, define Ω
k
i as {ωi : Π
Θ
i ((θ
′
i, ωi), θi) = Π
k
i (θ
′
i, θi)} and let
Ω∗,ki = Ω
k
i × Λi. Note that ∪kΩ
k
i = Ωi and thus ∪kΩ
∗,k
i = Ω
∗
i . It follows that
∪
ω∗i ∈Ω
∗,k
i
∪pθi∈Pi(θi) {ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi, ω
∗
i , λ
∗
i )} = ∪ωi∈Ωki ∪λi∈Λi ∪pθi∈Pi(θi){ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi , ωi, λi)}
= Πki (θ
′
i, θi),
as required. 
To shed further light on the role of ambiguous communication devices, we now con-
sider the starkest possible case, whereby there is no ex-ante ambiguity. In those envi-
ronments, all ambiguity is necessarily engineered by the mechanism designer.
4.3 No ex-ante ambiguity
Note that in environments with no ex-ante ambiguity (but with ambiguity-sensitive
players), a social choice function is implementable by an unambiguous mechanism if and
only if it is incentive compatible (with respect to the prior beliefs). Theorem 1 states,
however, that when the designer can engineer some ambiguity in its mechanism, a larger
set of social choice functions may be implemented. For instance, in the introductory
example, the use of an ambiguous mechanism made it possible to implement an ex-
post efficient allocation, while no unambiguous mechanism implements it. The following
proposition gives a sharper characterization of condition (B) in Theorem 1 and, thus, to
the scope of “belief engineering.”
Proposition 1 Assume that for each player i ∈ N , for each type θi ∈ Θi, Pi(θi) is
the singleton {pθi}. Let Π
k
i be any non-empty finite-valued belief correspondence and
denote Πki (θ
′
i, θi) = {pi
k,1k
θ′i,θi
, . . . , pik,lk
θ′i,θi
, . . . , pik,Lk
θ′i,θi
} the image of Πki at (θ
′
i, θi). The following
statements are equivalent:
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1. Condition (B) holds.
2. For each k ∈ Ki, for each θi ∈ Θi and θ
′
i ∈ Θi, |Π
k
i (θ
′
i, θi)| = |Π
k
i (θ
′
i, θ
′
i)|. For
each θi ∈ Θi, for each θ
′
i ∈ Θi, there exist positive scalars (µ
k,lk
θ′
i
,θi
) such that∑
k
∑
lk
µk,lk
θ′i,θi
= 1,
pθi =
|Ki|∑
k=1
Lk∑
lk=1
µk,lk
θ′i,θi
pik,lk
θ′i,θi
, (B1)
and, for all θ−i,
µk,lk
θ′i,θi
pik,lk
θ′i,θi
[θ−i] = µ
k,lk
θ′i,θ
′
i
pik,lk
θ′i,θ
′
i
[θ−i]
pθi[θ−i]
pθ′i[θ−i]
. (B2)
To understand Proposition 1, suppose that the social choice function f is Πi-incentive
compatible. Condition (B1) states that the convex hull of the “targeted” beliefs Πi(θi, θi)
must include the prior beliefs pθi in its interior, for each θi. This guarantees that one can
engineer an ambiguity device such that the set of posterior beliefs of player i of type θi is
precisely Πi(θi, θi), regardless of the message received, provided that players truthfully
report their types to the ambiguity device. This is a familiar result in the literature
on repeated game with incomplete information (e.g., Aumann, Maschler and Stearns,
1995), known as the “splitting lemma.” It is worth stressing that condition (B1) does
not require the prior to be a convex combination of each posterior in Πki (θi, θi) for all k,
but only to be a convex of the set of all posteriors (i.e., ∪kΠ
k
i (θi, θi)). Condition (B2)
guarantees furthermore that the constructed ambiguity device generates the targeted
beliefs Πi(θ
′
i, θi), when player i of type θi behave as type θ
′
i at the communication stage.
Theorem 1 together with Proposition 1 are central results: they make it possible to
“quantify” the role of endogenously engineered ambiguity in environments with no ex-
ante ambiguity. For instance, Section 5 revisits the classical monopolistic screening
problem and shows that full surplus extraction is possible, even when there is no ex-ante
ambiguity.
Proof (1)⇒ (2). Assume that condition (B) holds, so that there exist Ωi := ∪k∈KiΩ
k
i
and λi : Θi ×Θ−i → ∆(Ωi) such that
∪ωi∈Ωki {ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi, ωi, λi)} = Π
k
i (θ
′
i, θi),
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for all θ′i ∈ Θi, for all θi ∈ Θi, for all k ∈ Ki.
Clearly, we have that |Πki (θ
′
i, θi)| = |Π
k
i (θ
′
i, θ
′
i)| for any θi and θ
′
i. Moreover, to any
pik,lk
θ′i,θi
corresponds a message ωi ∈ Ω
k
i , call it ω
k,lk
i , such that ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi, ω
k,lk
i , λi) = pi
k,lk
θ′i,θi
.
Letting µk,lk
θ′i,θi
= (1/|Ki|)
∑
θ−i
λi(θ
′
i, θ−i)[ω
k,lk
i ]pθi(θ−i), conditions (B1) and (B2) directly
follow from the definition of ζθi.
(2) ⇒ (1). Let Ωki = {ω
k,1k
i , . . . , ω
k,lk
i , . . . , ω
k,Lk
i }. Construct λi : Θi × Θ−i →
∆(∪k∈KiΩ
k
i ) as follows: For each θi ∈ Θi, for each θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
λi(θi, θ−i)[ω
k,lk
i ] =
1
|Ki|
µk,lkθi,θipi
k,lk
θi,θi
[θ−i]
pθi [θ−i]
.
The rest directly follows from conditions (B1) and (B2) and the definition of ζθi. 
To conclude this section, we now consider environments with type-independent be-
liefs, a common assumption in applications.
4.4 Type-independent Beliefs
It is common in applications to assume that prior beliefs are stochastically independent.
This section considers a weaker notion of independence, type independence, that is
Pi(θi) = Pi for each θi ∈ Θi. In environments with type-independent beliefs, we have
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider environments with type-independent beliefs, i.e., for each player
i ∈ N , for each θi ∈ Θi, Pi(θi) = Pi. The following statements are equivalent:
1. The social choice function f is implementable by a finite ambiguous mechanism.
2. For each player i ∈ N , there exists a finite family (Πki )k∈Ki of belief sets such that:
(IC) For each k ∈ Ki, the social choice function f is Π
k
i -incentive compatible.
(B) There exist Ωi := ∪k∈KiΩ
k
i and λi : Θi ×Θ−i → ∆(Ωi) such that
∪pi∈Pi ∪ωi∈Ωki {ζθi(θ
′
i, pi, ωi, λi)} = Π
k
i , (B)
for all θ′i ∈ Θi, for all θi ∈ Θi, for all k ∈ Ki.
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According to Proposition 2, in environments with type-independent beliefs, we only
need check the incentive compatibility of a social choice function with respect to sets of
beliefs that are independent of the types of the players. The intuition is simple. Recall
that Πi(θ
′
i, θi) is the set of beliefs of player i of type θi at the allocation stage, when he
communicates as type θ′i at the communication stage.
15 If beliefs are type-independent,
we must have Πi(θ
′
i, θi) = Πi(θ
′
i, θˆi) for any (θi, θˆi). Denote Π
∗
i (θ
′
i) the set of beliefs
when player i communicates as type θ′i. Therefore, the social choice function to be
implemented must be incentive compatible with respect to Π∗i (θ
′
i) for any θ
′
i and, thus,
is incentive compatible with respect to Π∗i := Π
∗
i (θ
∗
i ) for an arbitrary θ
∗
i .
Although substantially simpler than the characterization for general environments
(Theorem 1), the above characterization is still not as simple and transparent as the
characterization we have in environments with no ex-ante ambiguity. Clearly, a necessary
condition for condition (B) to hold is that the set Pi of priors is a subset of the interior of
the convex hull of ∪kΠ
k
i for each player i ∈ N (unless, Π
k
i = Pi for some k). Conversely,
if there are two players, two types per player and that each Πki is a convex set, it is also
a sufficient condition. Thus, in those simple environments, we have a relatively simple
characterization. Proposition 3 summarizes this observation (the proof is in Appendix.)
Proposition 3 Consider environments with type-independent beliefs. Suppose that for
each player i ∈ N , there exists a collection (Πki )k of beliefs’ sets such the social choice
function f is Πki -incentive compatible for each k. Assume that there are two players, two
types per player, and that each Πki is a convex set, different from Pi.
A necessary and sufficient condition for condition (B) to hold is that the set Pi of
priors is a subset of the interior of the convex hull of ∪kΠ
k
i , for each player i ∈ N .
15I.e., we implicitly consider the canonical mechanism constructed in the proof of Theorem 1.
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5 An Economic Application
This section revisits the classical problem of monopolistic screening, but with ambiguity-
sensitive buyers. There are two potential buyers, labeled 1 and 2, and one monopolist
seller. Buyer i’s utility from purchasing a quantity xi of the good at the total price ti is
θixi− ti; θi can take two possible values θ and θ with θ > θ ≥ 0. The reservation utility
of a buyer is normalized to zero, regardless of his type. The seller’s cost of producing the
quantities (x1, x2) is c(x1 + x2) with c a strictly increasing and strictly convex function;
c(0) = 0. For simplicity, we assume that c is differentiable everywhere and denote c′(x)
the derivative of c at x. To rule out trivial corner solutions, let c′(0) = 0. Finally, let
p ∈ (0, 1) be the (common) prior belief that θi = θ.
So far, the problem is the classical textbook monopolistic screening problem. In
particular, if the buyers are subjective expected maximizers, there is no mechanism,
satisfying incentive compatibility and individual rationality, that allows the seller to
extract full surplus from the buyers. Unlike the classical model, however, we assume
that buyers have multiple-prior preferences.16 Moreover, we allow the seller to design
ambiguous (selling) mechanisms.
We first consider the first-best solutions. A first-best solution (x∗1, x
∗
2) is a solution
to the following maximization program:
max
x1,x2
θ1x1 + θ2x2 − c(x1 + x2).
Standard arguments together with the strict convexity of c gives the following solution:
(x∗1, x
∗
2) =


((1/2)(c′)−1(θ), (1/2)(c′)−1(θ)) if (θ1, θ2) = (θ, θ),
((c′)−1(θ), 0) if (θ1, θ2) = (θ, θ),
(0, (c′)−1(θ)) if (θ1, θ2) = (θ, θ),
((1/2)(c′)−1(θ), (1/2)(c′)−1(θ)) if (θ1, θ2) = (θ, θ).
16We maintain the assumption of full Bayesian updating.
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We now turn our attention to the optimal design problem between the seller and the
buyers, when the seller can offer ambiguous “contracts.” From our revelation principle,
we can restrict our attention to direct contracts (θi, θ−i) 7→ (xi(θi, θ−i), ti(θi, θ−i)) and
to finite families Πi := {Π
1
i , . . . ,Π
k
i , . . . ,Π
Ki
i } of beliefs’ sets. (See Propositions 1 and
2.) Throughout, we write Πki as {pi
1,k
i , . . . , pi
l,k
i , . . . , pi
Lk,k
i }. The optimization program is
thus:
sup
(x1, x2, t1, t2,Π1,Π2)
∑
(θ1,θ2)
(t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2)− c(x1(θ1, θ2) + x2(θ1, θ2)))p[θ1]p[θ2]
subject to the following constraints:
Incentive compatibility. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , Ki}, for each θi ∈
{θ, θ},
min
pii∈Πki
∑
θ−i
(θixi(θi, θ−i)− ti(θi, θ−i))pii[θ−i]
≥ min
pii∈Πki
∑
θ−i
∑
θ′i
σi(θi)[θ
′
i](θixi(θ
′
i, θ−i)− ti(θ
′
i, θ−i))pii[θ−i],
(ICi)
for all σi(θi) ∈ ∆({θ, θ}),
Individual rationality. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, for each θi ∈ {θ, θ},
∑
θ−i
(θixi(θi, θ−i)− ti(θi, θ−i))p[θ−i] ≥ 0, (IRi)
and
Beliefs. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, there exist (µl,ki )l,k with µ
l,k
i > 0 for all l ∈ {1, . . . , Lk}, for
all k ∈ {1, . . . , Ki}, such that
p =
∑
l,k
µl,kpil,ki , (Bi)
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and ∑
l,k
µl,ki = 1.
Two remarks are worth making. Firstly, the individual rationality constraints (IRi)
are defined ex-ante, since a buyer decides to participate (or not) in the mechanism
before receiving any messages. Secondly, if we constraint Πi to be {{p}} for each buyer
i ∈ {1, 2} (equivalently, if the seller cannot offer ambiguous contracts), the problem
boils down to the classical problem. Thus, if a solution exists, the seller is guaranteed
to extract more surplus from the buyers than in the classical problem. In fact, we now
show that the seller can extract all the surplus.
For any allocation x1(θ1, θ2) and x2(θ1, θ2), ex-post full rent extraction obtains when
no (informational) rents are left to the buyers, i.e., t1(θ1, θ2) = θ1x1(θ1, θ2) and t2(θ1, θ2) =
θ2x2(θ1, θ2). If, in addition, the allocations are efficient, i.e., x1(θ1, θ2) = x
∗
1(θ1, θ2) and
x2(θ1, θ2) = x
∗
2(θ1, θ2), ex-post full surplus extraction obtains. Let t
∗
i be the correspond-
ing payment scheme.
Clearly, if we can find a finite belief set Π∗i that satisfies condition (Bi) such that
(x∗i , t
∗
i ) is incentive compatible with respect to Π
∗
i , then (x
∗
i , t
∗
i ,Π
∗
i )i∈{1,2} is a solution to
the above problem.
So, consider the allocation corresponding to ex-post full surplus extraction, i.e.,
(x∗i , t
∗
i )i∈{1,2}. The payoff to buyer i of type θ (resp., θ) is depicted in the left panel
(resp., right panel) of the table below. For instance, if buyer i of type θ reports θ and
buyer j also reports θ, then buyer i’s payoff is (1/2)(θ − θ)(c′)−1(θ).
θ θ
θ 0 0
θ 0 (θ − θ) (c
′)−1(θ)
2
θ θ
θ (θ − θ) (c
′)−1(θ)
2
(θ − θ)(c′)−1(θ)
θ 0 0
Notice that truth-telling gives a payoff of zero to a buyer, regardless of his type and
the report of the other buyer. Moreover, truth-telling is strictly dominant for a buyer
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of type θ. Lastly, if Π∗i = {{0, 1}}, then buyer i of type θ has an incentive to truthfully
reveal his type when he expects the other buyer to do so. Since p ∈ (0, 1), condition (Bi)
is satisfied. Consequently, (x∗i , t
∗
i , {{0, 1}})i∈{1,2} is a solution to the seller’s program.
The solution is obviously not unique. However, it is easy to see that all solutions
correspond to ex-post full surplus extraction.
The result of ex-post full surplus extraction generalizes to environments with more
than two buyers and two types per buyer. To see this, suppose that there are n buyers
and for each buyer i, Θi := {θ
1, . . . , θl, . . . , θL}. Without loss of generality, assume that
0 < θ1 < · · · < θl · · · < θL. We continue to assume type-independent and unambiguous
prior beliefs, with pi the prior beliefs of player i and pi[θ−i] > 0 for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
Let θmax−i := max(θ1, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θn). For ease of exposition, let the cost func-
tion be (1/2)(
∑n
i=1 xi)
2. As before, the first-best allocation x∗ is given by: x∗i (θi, θ−i) =
θi/|{j : θj ≥ θ
max
−j }| if θi ≥ θ
max
−i and x
∗
i (θi, θ−i) = 0, otherwise. Let t
∗
i be the pay-
ment scheme such that t∗i (θi, θ−i) := θix
∗
i (θi, θ−i). Thus, the pair (x
∗, t∗) corresponds to
ex-post full surplus extraction.
The payoff to buyer i of type θl as function of his report θm and the highest report θmax−i
of all other buyers is depicted in the table below ( |θmax−i = θ
m| denotes the cardinality
of the set {j 6= i : θj = θ
max
−i = θ
m} ∪ {i}), i.e., the set of buyers reporting the highest
valuations, conditional on buyer i reporting the highest valuation):
θL . . . θl+1 θl θl−1 . . .
θL (θ
l−θL)θL
|θmax
−i =θ
L|
(θl − θL)θL . . .
...
θl+1 0 0 (θ
l−θl+1)θl+1
|θmax
−i =θ
l+1|
(θl − θl+1)θl+1 . . .
θl 0 0 0 0 0 0
θl−1 0 0 0 0 (θ
l−θl−1)θl−1
|θmax
−i =θ
l−1|
(θl − θl−1)θl−1
...
As above, it is immediate to verify that truth-telling is incentive compatible whenever
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the set of beliefs of buyer i includes pi∗i with pi
∗
i [θ
max
−i = θ
L] = 1. This is because the
minimum expected payoff from truth-telling is zero (irrespective of beliefs about the
other buyers), while the minimum expected payoff from any other strategy, mixed or
pure, cannot be greater than the value of the expected payoff calculated using the belief
pi∗i , which is at most zero. Lastly, since pi is in the interior of the simplex ∆(Θ−i) and pi
∗
i
is on the boundary of ∆(Θ−i), we can find a set Π
∗
i that includes pi
∗
i such that condition
(Bi) holds.
With minor modifications, the same arguments apply to an optimal auction design
problem (Myerson, 1981), so that ex-post full surplus extraction is possible.
As a final remark, consider the two-type model again and note that if buyer i has
multiple priors [p
i
, pi] with 0 < pi ≤ pi < 1, then ex-post full surplus extraction re-
mains the optimal solution. This follows from Proposition 3 and the observation that
(x∗i , t
∗
i )i∈{1,2} is incentive compatible with respect to [0, 1].
6 Concluding Discussion
This section offers a critical discussion of some of the salient features of our analy-
sis. Firstly, we argue that our results generalize without difficulties to a larger class of
ambiguity-sensitive preferences.
6.1 Richer preferences
Most of our results generalize to a number of preferences having a “multiple-prior”
representation. As a first example, consider the α-maxmin criterion. It is clear that
if we replace the incentive compatibility condition (IC) with the appropriate incentive
condition, all our results go through. With α-maxmin preferences, the appropriate
incentive condition is:
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α max
pii∈Πi(θ′′i ,θi)
∑
θ−i
ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i)
+(1− α) min
pii∈Πi(θ′′i ,θi)
∑
θ−i
ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i) ≥
α max
pii∈Πi(θ′′i ,θi)
∑
θ−i
∑
θ′i
σi(θi)[θ
′
i]ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i)
+(1− α) min
pii∈Πi(θ′′i ,θi)
∑
θ−i
∑
θ′i
σi(θi)[θ
′
i]ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i).
Variational preferences (Marinacci, Maccheroni and Rustichini, 2006) constitute an-
other example. With the incentive condition
min
pii∈Πi(θ′′i ,θi)
∑
θ−i
ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i) + ci(pii, θi) ≥
min
pii∈Πi(θ′′i ,θi)
∑
θ−i
∑
θ′i
σi(θi)[θ
′
i]ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i) + ci(pii, θi),
most of our results go through.17 Note, however, that Proposition 3 fails since we lose
the linearity in beliefs.
Yet, another example is the criterion of minimax regret. With the incentive compat-
ibility condition:
max
pii∈Πi(θ′′i ,θi)
∑
θ−i
[max
θ˜i
ui(f(θ˜i, θ−i), θi, θ−i)− ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)]pii(θ−i) ≤
max
pii∈Πi(θ′′i ,θi)
∑
θ−i
∑
θ′i
σi(θi)[θ
′
i][max
θ˜i
ui(f(θ˜i, θ−i), θi, θ−i)− ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi, θ−i)]pii(θ−i),
we have that any incentive compatible social choice function that satisfies condition (B)
is implementable by an ambiguous mechanism (the second part of Theorem 1). However,
the converse is not true. Simply, the criterion of minimax regret is not menu independent
and, thus, the implementation of a social choice function by a given mechanism is not
17The function ci(·, θi) is the ambiguity index of player i of type θi.
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equivalent to the implementation by the direct mechanism. See Saran (2011) for more
on this issue.
As a final example, we consider the Bewley preferences (Bewley, 2002). Since those
preferences are incomplete, there are two possible definitions of incentive compatibility
(see Lopomo, Rigotti and Shannon (2010)). The first definition states that truth-telling
dominates prior-by-prior any other report, whenever a player expects his opponents to
tell the truth, that is,
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i) ≥
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i),
for all θ′i ∈ Θi, for all pii ∈ Πi(θ
′′
i , θi), for all θ
′′
i ∈ Θi.
The second definition simply states that truth-telling is not dominated and, thus,
is implied by the first definition; that is, for all θi ∈ Θi, for all θ
′′
i ∈ Θi, no behavioral
strategy σi(θ
′′
i , θi) ∈ ∆(Θi) satisfies
∑
θ−i
∑
θ′i
σi(θ
′′
i , θi)[θ
′
i]ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i) >
∑
θ−i
ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi, θ−i)pii(θ−i),
for all pii ∈ Πi(θ
′′
i , θi). Nonetheless, regardless of the definition adopted, all our results go
through. In particular, with the first definition, we have that a social choice function is
implementable by an ambiguous mechanism if and only if it is implementable by a classic
mechanism (i.e., unambiguous and static). In other words, a social choice function is
implementable if and only if it is incentive compatible with respect to the prior beliefs.
Another important aspect of our analysis is the updating rule. We have assumed
prior-by-prior updating (full Bayesian updating), a popular assumption in applications.
However, other updating rules exist and, indeed, have axiomatic foundations. Following
Gilboa and Schmeilder (1993), we can assume the maximum-likelihood updating rule.
With that rule, a player updates the priors that maximize the likelihood of observing a
particular event. We have the following:
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Proposition 4 Assume the maximum-likelihood updating rule and no ex-ante uncer-
tainty. Assume that, for each player i, there exists a finite-valued belief correspondence
Πi : Θi ×Θi → ∆(Θ−i) such that the social choice function f is Πi-incentive compatible
with pθi the arithmetic mean of the elements of Πi(θ
′′
i , θi) for all θ
′′
i . Then, the social
choice function f is implementable by an ambiguous mechanism.
The intuition is simple. Consider the construction of the ambiguity communication
device in Proposition 1. If priors are arithmetic means of the targeted posteriors, we
have that each of the probability systems is equally likely to have generated a given
message, so that maximum-likelihood updating coincides with prior-by-prior updating.
Note, however, that the introductory example did not satisfy the above proposition.
Another updating rule we mention is Hanany-Klibanoff updating rules. Because
these updating rules guarantee a weak form of dynamic consistency, we generally have
the classical revelation principle (adapted to the preferences, of course). To be more
precise, suppose that f is not incentive compatible, i.e., there exist player i, types θi
and θ∗i such that fθ∗i ≻
θi
i fθi , where fθi denotes the act that gives f(θi, θ−i) in state θ−i
and ≻θii the strict preference of player i of type θi. Consider the set of all such acts, i.e.,
F := ∪θ′i∈Θi{fθ′i}. Since the set of types is finite, the set F is finite and, consequently, we
can assume that fθ∗i <
θi
i fθ′i for all θ
′
i. So, consider the set of acts F , the ex-ante optimal
act fθ∗i , the ex-ante preferences <
θi
i and the event {ωi}, corresponding to a profile of
messages received and sent by player i before the allocation stage. Moreover, since the
social choice function does not depend on cheap talk messages, we have that two acts
in F agree outside {ωi}. Consequently, dynamic consistency as defined in Hanany and
Klibanoff requires fθ∗i <
θi
{ωi},fθ∗
i
,F
fθi, while implementation requires fθi <
θi
{ωi},fθ∗
i
,F
fθ∗i
(<θi{ωi},fθ∗
i
,F
is player i’s conditional preference). This violates axiom DC3 (p. 273) in
Hanany and Klibanoff, but not their main axiom DC (p. 270) of dynamic consistency.
As already explained, the introductory example can be modified so that their main axiom
is satisfied. Consequently, a violation of their axiom DC is not a necessary condition
for our results to hold.
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Of course, this discussion does not exhaust all possible updating rules and ambiguity-
sensitive preferences. It simply suggests that our results extend to a larger class of
ambiguity-sensitive preferences and updating rules. Further research is certainly needed.
6.2 Ambiguity In The Allocation Mechanism
A noteworthy feature of ambiguous mechanisms is that no ambiguity is introduced at
the allocation stage; ambiguity is only introduced at the communication stage. This is,
however, without loss of generality. To see this, suppose that the allocation mechanism is
〈(Mi)i∈N , G〉 with G a set of allocation rules g :M → X, so that players are ambiguous
about the exact allocation rule used for implementation. For instance, the alternative
implemented might depend on the messages sent by the players as well as a draw from
an urn, which contains either blue balls or red balls, but with unknown proportions (an
“Ellsberg” urn.)
For the social choice function f to be implementable, however, there must exist a
consistent planning equilibrium s∗ such that g(mi, m−i) = f(θi, θ−i) for all (mi, m−i)
with ×i∈Ns
∗
i (θi, h
T+1
i )[mi] > 0, for all (h
T+1
i , h
T+1
−i ) with positive probability under s
∗,
and for all g ∈ G.18 Consequently, introducing ambiguity in the allocation mechanism
does not help in the partial implementation of social choice functions. This observation
may explain why most real-world mechanisms, e.g., voting systems, schooling allocation
mechanisms, auctions, have unambiguous allocation rules. Yet, as the work of Di Tillio,
Kos and Messmer suggests, ambiguity at the allocation stage might enlarge the set of
implementable social choice sets.
18To see this, note that if there exist g ∈ G, (hT+1i , h
T+1
−i ) with positive probability under s
∗, (mi,m−i)
with ×i∈Ns∗i (θi, h
T+1
i )[mi] > 0 such that g(mi,m−i) 6= f(θi, θ−i), then we have a violation of the
definition of implementation.
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6.3 Beyond Ambiguous Mechanisms
Ambiguous mechanisms are relatively simple. They consist of a finite number of stages
of mediated communication followed by an allocation stage. Clearly, there are more
general mechanisms. For instance, the communication device at stage t might depend
on the entire histories of messages sent and received up to period t. Similarly, for
the allocation. The following example illustrates some of the challenges in obtaining a
revelation principle for general ambiguous mechanisms.
There are two players, labeled 1 and 2, two types θ and θ′ for each player, and
two alternatives x and y. Types are private information. We assume that players have
multiple-prior preferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) with Pi the set of priors of
player i ∈ {1, 2} and ui his utility function. Suppose that u1(x, θ) = 1, u1(y, θ) = 0, that
player 1 of type θ′ and player 2 of both types are indifferent between all alternatives,
and that Pi is independent of player i’s type. An element of Pi represents a prior belief
of player i about the likelihood of player j’s type to be θ. For concreteness, assume that
{pi} = {1/3}.
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The designer aims at (partially) implementing the social choice function f defined
by: f(θ, θ) = x, f(θ, θ′) = y, f(θ′, θ) = y and f(θ′, θ′) = x.
The social choice function f is not implementable by an ambiguous mechanism.
Regardless of his beliefs, player 1 can guarantee a payoff of 1/2 by mixing uniformly
between θ and θ′. So, to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints (IC), we need
to find a finite collection of finite beliefs’ sets (Πki )k such that minΠ
k
i ≥ 1/2 for each k.
However, to satisfy condition (B), we also need that the prior belief 1/3 belongs to the
convex hull of ∪kΠ
k
i , which is impossible.
Yet, we claim that the social choice function is implementable by a more general
ambiguous mechanism. The mechanism has three stages. In the first stage, player 2
19More generally, all our arguments remain valid if Pi = [pi, pi] with pi < 1 − pi. Alternatively, if
p
i
≥ 1−pi, f is implementable with a classical direct mechanism, so that there is no need for non-trivial
ambiguous mechanisms.
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reports either θ or θ′ to the designer. Following player 2’s report, the designer sends
either ω or ω′ to player 1. There are two possible probability systems, λ and λ′. The first
probability system λ is fully specified by λ(ω|θ) = 1 and λ(ω′|θ′) = 1, while λ′(ω′|θ) = 1
and λ′(ω|θ′) = 1 fully specify the second probability system. Player 1 is not active in the
first stage. In the second stage, player 1 reports either θ or θ′ to the designer. If player
1 reports θ, the designer implements f(θ, θ) (resp., f(θ, θ′)) if player 2 reported θ (resp.,
θ′) in the first stage. Alternatively, if player 1 reports θ′, the mechanism moves to the
third and final stage. In the third stage, player 1 has again to report θ or θ′. If player 1
reports θ′, the designer implements f(θ′, θ) (resp., f(θ′, θ′)) if player 2 reported θ (resp.,
θ′) in the first stage. Alternatively, if player 1 reports θ, the designer implements y,
regardless of player 2’s report. (Player 2 is not active at the second and third stage.)
The distinctive feature of this mechanism is the multi-stage allocation mechanism. See
Figure 3 for a graphical illustration.
θ′θ
2
ω
ω′
θ′θ
f(θ, θ)
1
θ′
f(θ′, θ)
θ
y
1
ω
ω′
θ′θ
f(θ, θ′)
1
θ′
f(θ′, θ′)
θ
y
1
Figure 3: The mechanism
We now argue that both players have an incentive to truthfully reveal their types at
all stages. Since player 1 of type θ′ and player 2 of either type are indifferent between
all alternatives, they clearly have an incentive to truthfully reveal their types. So, let us
focus on player 1 of type θ. Consider the history (ω, θ′), i.e., player 1 has received the
message ω from the designer at the first stage and has reported θ′ at the second stage. By
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construction of the ambiguous communication device, player 1’s set of beliefs is {0, 1},
i.e., he believes that either player 2 is of type θ with probability 1 or of type θ′ with
probability 1. At (ω, θ′), player 1 is indifferent between reporting θ, which guarantees
a payoff of zero and reporting θ′. Moreover, no mixture between θ and θ′ is strictly
preferred to reporting θ.20 Consequently, it is optimal for player 1 of type θ to truthfully
report θ at the third stage following the history (ω, θ′). Let us move to the history (ω).
At (ω), player 1’ set of beliefs is {0, 1} and so he is indifferent between reporting θ and
any mixing between θ and θ′ (conditional on reporting θ at the third stage and, thus,
obtaining y for sure). So, it is optimal for player 1 of type θ to truthfully report θ at ω.
A similar argument holds at ω′, so that f is indeed implementable by the constructed
mechanism.
6.4 Continuum
This section generalizes our main result to environments and mechanisms with a con-
tinuum of alternatives, types, and messages. In particular, even in environments with a
finite number of alternatives and types, the designer may benefit from using a continuum
of messages. It makes it possible to engineer larger sets of beliefs and, consequently, to
relax the incentive-compatibility constraints.
Throughout, we endow any metrizable space Y with BY , the σ-algebra of Borel sets on
Y , to form the probability space (Y,BY ). Denote ∆(Y ) the set of all probability measures
on (Y,BY ). We endow ∆(Y ) with the weak* topology. Let Y and Y
′ be two metrizable
spaces. A function φ from Y to ∆(Y ′) is measurable if φ−1(OY ′) ∈ BY for all OY ′ ∈
B∆(Y ′), the Borel σ-algebra on ∆(Y
′) endowed with the weak* topology. A probability
measure µ on (Y,BY ) admits the probability density ζ if µ is absolutely continuous
with respect to the Lebesgue measure on Y and has Radon-Nikodym derivative ζ (with
respect to the Lebesgue measure). We denote ∆ˆ(Y ) ⊆ ∆(Y ) the set of such probability
20This follows from the c-independence of the multiple prior preferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler,
1989).
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measures. With a slight abuse of notation, we write ∆ˆ(Y ) for the set of probability
densities corresponding to the set of measures ∆ˆ(Y ). Finally, we endow products of
topological spaces with the product topology.
With these mathematical preliminaries done, assume that all sets introduced in Sec-
tion 3 (i.e., X, (Θi)i, (Ωi,t,Ω
∗
i,t)i,t, (Mi)i, etc) are subsets of metrizable spaces; that
functions (i.e., payoff functions, probability systems, strategies, etc) are measurable,
and that each probability measure admits a strictly positive density. For each t, Λt is
a measurable subset of the set of all measurable probability systems λt : Ωt → ∆(Ω
∗
t )
with densities. Assume that each {λt} is measurable and that there exists a density ν
such that ν(λt) > 0.
With these technical assumptions, we have that
ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi , ωi, λ)[θ−i] =
∫
ω−i
λˆ((θ′i, θ−i))[(ωi, ω−i)]pˆθi(θ−i)dω−i∫
ω−i
∫
θ−i
λˆ((θ′i, θ−i))[(ωi, ω−i)]pˆθi(θ−i)dω−idθ−i
,
with λˆ(θ) the probability density corresponding to the measure λ(θ) and pˆθi the proba-
bility density corresponding to the measure pθi.
Theorem 2 The following statements are equivalent:
1. The social choice function f is implementable by an ambiguous mechanism.
2. For each player i ∈ N , there exists a family of non-empty valued correspondences
(Πki : Θi ×Θi → ∆ˆ(Θ−i))k∈Ki such that:
(IC) For each k ∈ Ki, the social choice function f is Π
k
i -incentive compatible.
(B) There exist Ωi := ∪k∈KiΩ
k
i and λi : Θi ×Θ−i → ∆ˆ(Ωi) such that
∪pθi∈P (θi) ∪ωi∈Ωki {ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi, ωi, λi)} = Π
k
i (θ
′
i, θi), (B3)
for all θ′i ∈ Θi, for all θi ∈ Θi, for all k ∈ Ki.
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Proof Only minor modifications to the proof of Theorem 1 are required. The only
modification required to prove that (2) ⇒ (1) is to show that the subgroup of cyclic
permutations from Ωi to Ωi has the cardinality of Ωi. Let ρα0 : Ωi → Ωi be the identity
function and define inductively the bijection ρα : Ωi → Ωi such that ρα(ωi) 6= ρα′(ωi) for
all α′ < α, for all ωi ∈ Ω. Let A be the set of all such α. Clearly, the cardinality of A
is weakly smaller than the cardinality of Ωi, so suppose that |A| < |Ωi|. It follows that
| ∪α {ρα(ωi)}| = |A| < |Ωi|. From the axiom of choice, it follows that for each ωi ∈ Ωi,
we can choose ρ(ωi) ∈ Ωi \ (∪α{ρα(ωi)}) such that ρ is a bijection, a contradiction.
The modification required to prove that (1)⇒ (2) is in the definition of λ∗i : we define
λ∗i (θi, θ−i)[(ωi, λi)] := λi(θi, θ−i)[ωi]ν(λi), with ν the density on Λi. 
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: the general case We treat the case of a family of corre-
spondences. The proof is almost identical to the proof in the main text. We only sketch
the important differences.
Suppose that for each player i ∈ N , there exists a family of non-empty valued
correspondences Πki : Θi ×Θi → ∆(Θ−i) such that conditions (IC) and (B) hold. Since
condition (B) holds, there exists (Ωki )k∈Ki and λi such that ∪pθi∈P (θi){ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi, ωi, λi)} ⊆
Πki (θ
′
i, θi) for all ωi ∈ Ω
k
i .
For each k ∈ Ki, consider a permutation ρ
k : Ωki → Ω
k
i and the probability system λ
ρ
i :
Θ×Θ−i → ∆(Ωi) defined by λ
ρ
i (θ)[ωi] = λi(θ)[ρ
k(ωi)] for all ωi ∈ Ω
k
i , for all k ∈ Ki. De-
fine Λi as in the proof of Theorem 1 (i.e., as {λ
ρ : ρki is a cyclic permutation for each k}),
we obtain that ∪λi∈Λi ∪pθi∈P (θi) {ζθi(θ
′
i, pθi , ωi, λi)} = Π
k
i (θ
′
i, θi) for all ωi ∈ Ω
k
i , for all
k ∈ Ki. The rest of the proof is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 1 and left to
the reader. 
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Lemma 1 If the social choice function f is implementable by the ambiguous mechanism
〈〈(Ω∗i,t,Ωi,t)i∈N ,Λt〉t=1,...,T , 〈(Mi)i∈N , g〉〉,
then f is implementable by a two-stage ambiguous mechanism.
Proof of Lemma 1 Suppose that the social choice function f is implementable by
the ambiguous mechanism
〈〈(Ω∗i,t,Ωi,t)i∈N ,Λt〉t=1,...,T , 〈(Mi)i∈N , g〉〉,
and let (s∗,ΠH,Θ) be the consistent planning equilibrium implementing f . Consider the
two-stage mechanisms:
〈〈(Θi,×t(Ω
∗
i,t × Ωi,t))i∈N ,Λ〉, 〈(Mi)i∈N , g〉〉,
with Λ constructed as follows. For any (λ1, . . . , λT ) ∈ Λ1 × · · · × ΛT , we associate the
communication system λ defined by:
λ(θ)[(ω∗t , ωt)
T
t=1] := s
∗(θ)[ω∗1]λ1(ω
∗
1)[ω1]× . . .
× · · · × s∗(θ, (ω∗t , ωt)
τ
t=1)[ω
∗
τ ]λτ (ω
∗
τ )[ωτ ]× . . .
× · · · × s∗(θ, (ω∗t , ωt)
T−1
t=1 )[ω
∗
T ]λT (ω
∗
T )[ωT ].
LetH∗∗ the relevant histories. Note each element ofH∗∗ is an element ofH . Consider
the profile of strategies s∗∗ with s∗∗i (θi) = θi at the initial history and s
∗∗
i (θi, (ω
∗
i,t, ωi,t)
T
t=1) =
s∗i (θi, h
T+1
i ) with h
T+1
i = ((ω
∗
i,t, ωi,t)
T
t=1).
By construction, if the history hT+1i = ((ω
∗
i,t, ωi,t)
T
t=1) has positive probability under
s∗, then the profile of messages ((ω∗i,t, ωi,t)
T
t=1) has positive probability under s
∗∗. More-
over, the set of beliefs of player i of type θi conditional on the message ((ω
∗
i,t, ωi,t)
T
t=1) is
exactly equal to ΠH,Θi (θi, h
T+1
i ).
Since the consistent planning equilibrium (s∗,ΠH,Θ) implements f , it follows that the
strategy profile (s∗∗,ΠH
∗∗,Θ) is a consistent planning equilibrium of the game induced
by the two-stage mechanism and, furthermore, implements f . 
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Proof of Proposition 2 (2)⇒ (1). This follows from Theorem 1.
(1)⇒ (2). The proof is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 1. We only sketch
the main differences. Since beliefs are type-independent, we have that ΠΘ(θi, (θi, ωi)) =
ΠΘi (θ
′
i, (θi, ωi)) for any θi and θ
′
i, for any history (θi, ωi). Denote Π
Θ((θi, ωi)) the beliefs
at history (θi, ωi).
For each player i ∈ N , fix a type θ∗i ∈ Θi and for each λ ∈ Λ, define λ
∗
i : Θ−i → ∆(Ωi)
with λ∗i (θ−i)[ωi] =
∑
ω−i
λ(θ∗i , θ−i)[(ωi, ω−i)]. Denote Λ
∗
i the set of such probability
systems.
We claim the social choice function f is implementable by
〈〈(Θi,Ωi,Λ
∗
i )i∈N〉, 〈(Mi)i∈N , g〉〉.
Consider the strategy profile s∗ for which players truthfully reports their types at the
first stage and at the second stage, regardless of the history. It is a consistent planning
equilibrium. To see this, notice that regardless of player i’s report at the first stage,
the set of player i’s beliefs at the history (θi, ωi) is Π
Θ
i ((θ
∗
i , ωi)). Moreover, since f is
implementable by the mechanism
〈〈(Θi,Ωi)i∈NΛ〉, 〈(Mi)i∈N , g〉〉,
we have from Theorem 1 that f is incentive compatible with respect to ΠΘi ((θ
∗
i , ωi)) for
each player i ∈ N , for each ωi. Thus, s
∗ is indeed a consistent planning equilibrium.
The rest of the proof then follows as in the proof of Theorem 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose that there are two players, labeled 1 and 2, and
each player i ∈ {1, 2} has two types θ and θ′. Let Pi ⊆ ∆({θ, θ
′}) be the non-empty,
convex, closed set of priors of player i. Suppose that f is incentive compatible with
respect to the non-empty, convex and closed set of beliefs Πi for each player i. Notice
that since player i’s expected payoff is linear in beliefs, f is also incentive compatible
with respect to Π∗i , with {pi
1
i , pi
2
i } ⊆ Π
∗
i ⊆ Πi and {pi
1
i , pi
2
i } the set of extreme points of
Πi, for each player i. Let pi and p
′
i be the two extreme points of Pi with pi(θ) ≤ p
′
i(θ).
Without loss of generality, assume that pi1i (θ) ≤ pi
2
i (θ).
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Assume that pi(θ) and p
′
i(θ) are strictly in between pi
1
i (θ) and pi
2
i (θ), so that Pi in
the interior of Πi.
Fix q2i ∈ ∆({θ, θ
′}) such that pi = µ1pi
1
i + µ2q
2
i with µ1 > 0, µ2 > 0 and µ1 + µ2 = 1.
Let Ω = {ω1, ω2}. The idea is to construct a probability system λi : {θ, θ
′} → ∆(Ω) such
that player i’s posterior is pi1i (resp., q
2
i ) conditional on ω1 (resp., ω2), when he uses the
prior pi, and to “control” q
2
i so that player i’s posterior is pi
2
i conditional on ω2, when he
uses the prior p′i. Define λi as follows:
λi(θ)[ω1] =
µ1pi
1
i (θ)
pi(θ)
,
λi(θ)[ω2] =
µ2q
2
i (θ)
pi(θ)
,
λi(θ
′)[ω1] =
µ1pi
1
i (θ
′)
pi(θ′)
,
λi(θ
′)[ω2] =
µ2q
2
i (θ
′)
pi(θ′)
.
Denote ζi(pi, ω, λi) the posterior belief of player i about the type of his opponent,
conditional on the message ω, when he uses the prior pi. By construction, we have that
ζi(pi, ω1, λi) = pi
1
i and ζi(pi, ω2, λi) = q
2
i . We now derive ζi(p
′
i, ω, λi) for any ω ∈ Ω. We
have
ζi(p
′
i, ω1, λi)[θ] =
pi1i (θ)(p
′
i(θ)/pi(θ))
pi1i (θ)(p
′
i(θ)/pi(θ)) + pi
1
i (θ
′)(p′i(θ
′)/pi(θ′))
:= q1i (θ),
ζi(p
′
i, ω2, λi)[θ] =
q2i (θ)(p
′
i(θ)/pi(θ))
q2i (θ)(p
′
i(θ)/pi(θ)) + q
2
i (θ
′)(p′i(θ
′)/pi(θ′))
,
ζi(p
′
i, ω1, λi)[θ
′] = 1− ζi(p
′
i, ω1, λi)[θ],
ζi(p
′
i, ω2, λi)[θ
′] = 1− ζi(p
′
i, ω2, λi)[θ].
So, we want to find q2i such that ζi(p
′
i, ω2, λi) = pi
2
i , while q
1
i must belong to Πi.
Notice that the function φ : [0, 1]→ R+, defined by
φ(y) =
y(p′i(θ)/pi(θ))
y(p′i(θ)/pi(θ)) + (1− y)(p
′
i(θ
′)/pi(θ′))
,
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is continuous and increasing in y ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover,
y(p′i(θ)/pi(θ))
y(p′i(θ)/pi(θ)) + (1− y)(p
′
i(θ
′)/pi(θ′))
= y
1
y + (1− y)
p′i(θ
′)
pi(θ′)
pi(θ)
p′i(θ)
≥ y,
since pi(θ) ≤ p
′
i(θ), pi(θ
′) = 1− pi(θ), and p
′
i(θ
′) = 1− p′i(θ).
For a solution to exist, we need to satisfy the following inequalities:
pi1i (θ) ≤ q
1
i (θ) = φ(pi
1
i (θ)) ≤ pi
2
i (θ),
φ(pi1i (θ)) ≤ pi
2
i (θ),
q2i (θ) ≥ pi(θ).
The first inequality is required for q2i to be in the convex hull of {pi
1
i , pi
2
i }, the second
inequality is required for the existence of a solution of f(q2i ) = pi
2
i , and the last inequality
is required for the µ’s to be well-defined.
Notice that first inequality is equivalent to the second inequality. Moreover, the last
inequality is automatically satisfied if the second is. To see this, observe that the second
inequality implies that there exists q2i such that φ(q
2
i (θ)) = pi
2
i (θ); this follows from the
intermediate value theorem. By contradiction, assume that q2i (θ) < pi(θ). Since φ is
increasing, we have that φ(q2i (θ)) = pi
2
i (θ) ≤ φ(pi(θ)) = p
′
i(θ) < pi
2
i (θ), a contradiction.
From the definition of φ, it follows that a solution exists, whenever
pi1i (θ)
pi1i (θ
′)
pi2i (θ
′)
pi2i (θ)
≤
(p′i(θ
′)/pi(θ
′))
(p′i(θ)/pi(θ))
=
p′i(θ
′)
pi(θ′)
pi(θ)
p′i(θ)
.
The last inequality is satisfied whenever pi(θ) and p
′
i(θ) are in between pi
1
i (θ) and pi
2
i (θ),
as postulated. To summarize, we have that ∪p˜i∈Pi ∪ω∈Ω {ζi(p˜i, ω, λi)} = co{pi
1
i , q
2
i } ∪
co{q1i , pi
2
i } := Π
∗
i ⊆ Πi, as required. 
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